The Public Perception of Cyber-surveillance Before and After Edward Snowden’s Surveillance Revelations by Završnik, Aleš & Levičnik, Pia
2015]A. Završnik, P. Levičnik: The Public Perception of Cyber-Surveillance ... 33
THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF CYBER-
SURVEILLANCE BEFORE AND AFTER EDWARD
SNOWDEN’S SURVEILLANCE REVELATIONS
by
ALEŠ ZAVRŠNIK*, PIA LEVIČNIK**
The article contextualizes contemporary cyber-surveillance practices in the light
of Edward  Snowden’s  revelations  of  massive  espionage  by  intelligences  services
and shows the  results  of  an online  survey on the  public  perceptions of  privacy
in public  telecommunication  networks  in  Slovenia.  The  results  relate  to  types
and frequency  of  victimization;  self-reported  study  on  violating  of  the  privacy
of others;  concern  for  the  protection  of  one’s  own  privacy;  perception  of  those
carrying out surveillance; the value of privacy; views on abrogated data retention
regulation; and awareness of personal data protection remedies.
Despite  growing distrust  of  large  internet  corporations  and –  after  Edward
Snowden’s revelations – Intelligence agencies, the findings indicate a low degree
of awareness  and  care  for  the  protection  of  personal  data.  In  regard  to
the perception of primary subjects of surveillance, 56 percent of respondents chose
internet  corporations  as  the  greatest  threat  to  their  privacy,  followed  by
telecommunications companies (25 percent), and shops with loyalty programs (23
percent).  According  to  chi-square  and Cramer's  coefficient  calculations,  gender
correlation is weak, but men feel more threatened by foreign intelligence services
and the Slovene Intelligence and Security Agency. By comparing responses before
and after  the  Datagate  affair,  we  noted that  prior  to  this  date,  only  a  handful
of people felt threatened by foreign or domestic intelligence agencies. An increased
feeling of threat after this date is evident in men as well as women.
* ales.zavrsnik@pf.uni-lj.si, Researcher Associate at the Institute of Criminology at the Faculty
of Law in Ljubljana and Assistant Professor at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia.
** pia.levicnik@gmail.com, currently working as a legal counsellor (electronic communication
law), occasionally cooperating with researchers from the Institute of criminology (Faculty of
law, Ljubljana).
DOI 10.5817/MUJLT2015-2-3
34 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 9:2
KEY WORDS
Privacy, Personal Data Protection, Public Opinion Survey, Perception of Privacy,
The  Internet,  Social  Networking,  Snowden,  Intelligence  Services,  Information
Commissioner, Data Protection Authority (DPA), Data Retention, Slovenia
1. INTRODUCTION
The deepening of the digital economy is creating a vast amount of personal
data. The existing internet business model is built  on surveillance. 1 States
thus  want  to  access  personal  data  for  law  enforcement  and  intelligence
purposes,  while  internet  and  telecommunications  companies  want
to maximize  their  profits  by  monetizing  data.  Today,  the  real  danger
to fundamental liberties, such as privacy, thus lies in new alliances between
governments  and  private  companies  that  are  creating  the  “surveillance-
industrial complex”.2 
Edward  Snowden’s  revelations  of  massive  espionage  by  intelligences
services  in  June  2013  exposed  all  these  dimensions  of  contemporary
surveillance.  The  revealed  information  poses  several  broader  questions
related  to  surveillance  in  the  digital  age:  1)  How  should  privacy  be
understood? 2) How should security actors with often overlapping powers
be  regulated?  3)  How  should  power  relations  on  the  internet  be
understood? 
1) The need to understand privacy in a new way has been extensively
addressed  by  prominent  scholars  in  the  last  decade.  For  instance,
Nissenbaum has claimed that privacy should be understood as “contextual
integrity”.3 Her theory of the contextual integrity of privacy is based on the
assumption that personal data is always linked to a certain social context,
and  that  in  any  such  context  there  are  specific  norms  that  determine
the appropriateness  of  the  disclosure  of  personal  data  and  the  norms
of personal data flows. New technologies such as Vehicle Safety Technology
(VSC) disrupt the contextual integrity of personal data, either because they
violate the norms of appropriateness, or the norms of distribution (Zimmer,
1 Schneier, B.,  Surveillance Is The Business Model Of The Internet . Viewed December 14 2014.
Available at: https://www.schneier.com/news/archives/2014/04/surveillance_is_the.html.
2 Ball,  K.,  Snider,  L.  2013,  The  Surveillance-Industrial  Complex:  A  Political  Economy  Of
Surveillance, Routledge, New York.
3 Nissenbaum, H. 2004, Privacy As Contextual Integrity, Washington Law Review, 79 (2004) 1,
pp. 119–158.
Nissenbaum, H. 1998, Protecting Privacy In An Information Age: The Problem With Privacy In
Public, Law And Philosophy, 17 (1998), pp. 559–596.
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2005).  For example, VSC technology that allows vehicles to communicate
with  each  other  and  with  road  infrastructure  enables  vehicle  tracking,
which  leads  to  digital  databases  on one’s  whereabouts,  paths,  and time
spent  at  specific  destinations.  This  clearly  exceeds  the  notion  of  the
reasonable expectation of privacy in public spaces as the technology collects
more than only visual and non-specific information about our movements.
A similar attempt to refashion our understanding of privacy has been
made by Solove with his theory of a “pluralistic understanding of privacy”.4
Privacy is not a concept with necessary and sufficient elements, he claims,
but should be understood as a set of “family resemblances”. Orwell’s “Big
Brother”,  an  overused  analogy  for  contemporary  surveillance  practices,
inadequately  captures  the  contemporary  challenges  as  it  focuses  merely
on data  collection.  The  mysterious  ways  in  which  digital  data  is  being
collected, stored, traded, and sold puts data subjects in a confusing situation
that more resembles Kafka’s protagonist Josef K. from the novel The Trial.
The  predominant  problems  concerning  privacy  are  related  to  data
processing, as “ordinary” citizens have immense difficulties in identifying
the accountable entities benefiting from their personal data. Pursuing “data
justice”  is  as  confusing  as  in  court  proceedings  in  The Trial:  Who owns
personal data? Where is data stored and processed? How can data subjects
reach  the  accountable  data  controllers  and processors  while  data  moves
from “cloud” to “cloud” or from one jurisdiction to another, and while it is
being  traded  for  different  sorts  of  purposes,  without  the  data  subject
benefiting from such trade?5
2)  Snowden’s  revelations  challenge  regulatory  issues  in  the  “control
and security domain”.6 Since the end of the Cold War, boundaries between
actors  in  the  “control  and  security  domain”  have  become  increasingly
blurred.  The  military  is  extensively  engaged  in  missions  typical  of  law
enforcement agencies, while the police have become increasingly involved
in  military  missions  abroad  and  domestically,  on  one  hand,  and  in
4 Solove,  D. 2007,  “I’ve Got  Nothing To Hide” And Other Misunderstandings  Of Privacy,  San
Diego Law Review, 44 (2007), p. 745.
5 For instance,  tweets are being sold to a deep-fat-fryer manufacturer. Viewed 15 January
2015. Available at:http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/nov/05/twitter-soggyfries-
big-data-advertising.
6 The  blurring  of  boundaries  in  the  control  and  security  domain  has  been  extensively
researched over the last two decades. See an overview in Završnik, A. 2013,  Blurring The
Line Between Law Enforcement And Intelligence, Journal of Contemporary European Research,
9 (1) p. 182-202. Available at: http://www.jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/view/452.
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intelligence  operations,  on  the  other.7 Finally,  intelligence  agencies  as
the third entity in the control and security domain are now entrusted with
more law enforcement duties,  e.g.  in the fight  against  serious crime and
terrorism.8 Such blurring of the boundaries between the main actors in the
“control and security domain” puts ordinary citizens in a legally uncertain
position.9 The  division  between  these  actors  has  always  been  artificial
and in flux to some degree, but the contemporary blurring of boundaries
disallows the possibility of a firm regulatory framework that would prevent
abuses such as those revealed by Snowden. 
3) Last but not least, Snowden’ revelations indirectly point to a power
struggle for control over the internet. According to Schneier, contemporary
cyber-surveillance  is  best  understood by  distinguishing  different  centres
of power  that  use  new  technologies.10 Governments  and  corporations
are traditional powers, while distributed power occurs in two forms: either
as the “negative” power of criminal groups, or the “positive” power of, for
instance,  dissident  groups.  Today,  the  traditional  power  of  governments
and  corporations  is  growing  exponentially.  The  development  of  online
social  networks,  cloud  computing  services,  and  the  design  of  devices
controlled remotely by manufacturers, along with the general deepening of
the digital economy, all strengthen the power of companies. In one way or
another,  governments  gained  access  to  the  data  collected  by  these
companies.  Governments want to strengthen their  models of  governance
with  data  analytics  and  algorithms  and  use  new  stockpiles  of  data
in various  domains,  such  as  policing,  where  predictive  policing  aims  to
determine the location of future crimes based on existing criminal records.
To  conclude,  these  are  some  of  the  parameters  of  the  contemporary
situation  in  the  cyber-surveillance  domain  revealed  also  by  Snowden’s
revelations  in  2013.  But,  how do all  three  of  these  broader  issues  affect
the public  perception  of  cyber-surveillance?  Public  attitudes  towards
7 Den  Boer,  M.,  Janssens,  J.,  Vanderbeken,  T.,  Easton,  M.,  Moelker,  R.  2010,  Epilogue,
Concluding Notes On The Convergence Between Military And Police Roles,  in Blurring
Military  And  Police  Roles,  eds.  Easton,  M.,  Den  Boer,  M.,  Janssens,  J.,  Moelker,  R.,
Vanderbeken T., Eleven International Publishing, The Hague.
8 Lutterbeck, D. 2005,  “Blurring The Dividing Line: The Convergence Of Internal And External
Security In Western Europe”, European Security, 14 (2), pp. 231-253.
9 See, e.g., Vervaele, J. 2005,  “Terrorism And Information Sharing Between The Intelligence And
Law Enforcement  Communities  In  The  US And The  Netherlands:  Emergency  Criminal  Law?”,
Utrecht Law Review 1 (1), pp. 1-27.
10 Schneier,  B.  The Battle For Power On The Internet.  Viewed 26 January 2015.  Available  at:
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/10/the-battle-for-power-on-the-
internet/280824/.
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surveillance technologies vary from technology to technology and between
countries.  Generally,  the  public  rarely  has  a  chance  to  appraise  all
the relevant  information  about  particular  technologically  enhanced
surveillance  practices  (TESPs),  giving  rise  to  highly  varied  responses
to individual surveillance technologies.  For often arbitrary reasons, public
opinion  in  different  countries  may  accept  some  TESPs  but  passionately
oppose others. This paper is an attempt to understand public perceptions
of cyber-surveillance in Slovenia. This knowledge has been gained on the
basis  of  the  results  of  an online  survey encompassing  attitudes  towards
several surveillance technologies that was conducted in Slovenia in 2012,
2013, and 2014. It shows whether and how Snowden’s revelations regarding
mass  surveillance  carried  out  by  the  intelligences  services  of  the  USA,
the UK, and other  countries’  have changed the general  public’s  attitudes
to surveillance.
2. METHODOLOGY
At the  Institute  of  Criminology at  the  Faculty  of  Law of  the  University
of Ljubljana, we conducted an online survey (using Google docs) on the use
of  information  technology,  cyber  crime,  and  victimization,  within  the
project “Surveillance and Crime Control: Ethical, legal, and criminological
aspects of emerging pre-crime detection and surveillance technologies” in
the years 2012 – 2014. The online survey consisted of 31 closed questions
(interval questions, yes/no questions, tabular questions with multiple choice
options,  grading tables)  and four demographic questions.  The analysis  is
based  on responses  from the academic  year  2012/2013 (October to  May)
and from the academic  year  2013/2014  (October  to  January).  The  survey
consisted of four sets of questions:
1. Cyber victimization:  we asked the participants how they feel about
interception  of  the  content  of  online  communications,  whether  they had
experienced abuse of their personal data or if their photographs had been
published  without  their  prior  consent.  We  also  asked  them  about  self-
protective  behaviour  (e.g.  whether  they  use  different  types  of  computer
software protection),  about their understanding of various online threats,
and about their (potential)  reactions after being victimized (i.e.  we asked
them who they would turn to after suffering online victimization).
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2.  Cyber activities:  a  self-report  study on violations  of  the privacy  of
others was conducted. The questions dealt with how or if respondents had
violated the privacy rights of others online, especially in social networks.
3.  Protection  of  personal  data:  we  were  interested  in  how concerned
participants are with personal data safety in various surveillance domains
(e.g. on the internet; in the process of having personal document made; in
public spaces monitored by video surveillance systems; regarding use of the
“Urbana” city smart card; and in using loyalty programmes offered by retail
chains). We asked them about their level of anxiety in relation to various
agents of social control, their willingness to submit their personal data for
a variety of benefits, their awareness and attitudes towards data retention
in public  telecommunication  networks,  and  their  awareness  of  different
mechanisms that are in place for safeguarding fundamental liberties. 
4.  Attitudes  regarding  specific  surveillance  technologies  in  road
transport  (e.g.  the  respondents’  degree  of  support  regarding  such
technologies) and on the internet (e.g. how they perceive control over their
own personal data; privacy settings in social networks, etc.). 
The  respondents  were  invited  to  participate  in  the  survey  via  e-
invitations,  either  with  the  help  of  their  faculties  (i.e.  university
school/division) through e-boards or by e-mail. Students were the targeted
population; those who took part in the survey were mainly students of the
Faculty  of  Law  and  the  Faculty  of  Social  Sciences  of  the  University
of Ljubljana,  and  the  Faculty  of  Criminal  Justice  and  Security
of the University of Maribor. 
Data analysis was carried out with the SPSS 15 software. *** We created
two-dimensional frequency (contingency) tables, used Pearson’s chi-square
test  for  the  calculation  of  links  between  variables,  the  likelihood  ratio,
Cramer’s  coefficient,  and  ordinal  logistic  regression.  A  χ²  test  was
conducted with a level of significance of a = 0.05 (the limit of probability
below which we are able to reject the null hypotheses).
Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  when  testing  the  independence
of variables  on  smaller  samples  the  likelihood  ratio  is  generally  more
accurate, while Pearson’s chi-square (χ²) is typically used in larger samples,
we always used both. If χ² was smaller than 0.05 with Pearson and larger
for the likelihood ratio, we agreed that the variables were not related. For
*** We would like to thank Bogomil Brvar for providing help with the statistical analysis.
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determining the mean values, we created charts of mean values and a 95%
confidence interval.
For differences  between the sexes we used ordinal  logistic  regression,
where  sex,  the  independent  variable,  could  be  male  or  female,  while
the dependent variable could take a value anywhere in the interval (1-5).
The  first  round  of  surveying  was  conducted  in  the  academic  year
2012/2013, and the sample amounted to 539 (n1). In that particular period
we gradually added additional questions and thus we have another sample
that answered four questions in  the same period (n2 = 481).  The second
round was conducted in the following academic year, 2013/2014, when we
reached a sample of 266 (n3).
3. PRIVACY VICTIMIZATION
Among  the  various  risks  on  the  internet,  66%  of  respondents  perceive
the risk of the interception of communications content as quite problematic
(on a scale from 1 – not a problem, and 5 – very problematic, 4 or 5 were
the most  frequent  responses),  while  a  whopping  82%  of  respondents
perceive  malicious  computer  software  (malware),  which  is  often  used
to invade privacy, as highly problematic (4 or 5); only child pornography
and financial fraud were perceived as more problematic.
Figure 1: Perceived dangers on the internet
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When participants  were  asked if  they had ever  experienced  internet-
related privacy victimization,  9% of respondents revealed that they have
been the victim of personal data theft at least once. 23% of respondents had
been victimized by unauthorised publication of compromising photographs
of themselves (e.g. on Facebook or via e-mail).
We  also  examined  the  familiarity  of  the  respondents  with  computer
malware, phishing,  botnet networks, credit  card skimming, and spyware.
35% of the respondents declared that they knew “quite well” or “very well”
the imminent threats to users’ privacy posed by spyware (on a scale from
1 – not acquainted and 5 – very well acquainted). This percentage is still not
as  high  as  stated  familiarity  with  computer  malware,  but  nevertheless
considerably higher than with other online threats.
As  self-protective  preventive  behaviour  represents  the  key  solution
for all-inclusive privacy protection, we asked the respondents about their
computer self-protection measures.
Figure 2: Self-protective measures – prevention
In  order  to  learn  about  the  extent  of  self-protective  behaviour  after
victimization has already occurred, we asked the respondents whom they
would  turn  to  in  the  event  of  online  threats,  such  as  an  unauthorised
computer hack, an unexplained crash of a computer system, spam, social
network bullying, mobile phone bullying, and personal data abuse.
No one 9 %
Law enforcement agencies 75 %
Any independent IT expert 8 %
My internet service provider 4 %
The Academic and Research Network
of Slovenia (Arnes), SICERT
2 %
Figure 3: Self-protective measures – response in the event of online personal data abuse
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In the event of personal data abuse, the respondents revealed a much
higher degree of trust towards the police than with other online threats,
especially regarding an unauthorised computer hack, regarding which the
respondents put their faith in independent experts rather than the police.
No one 16 %
Law enforcement agencies 26 %
Any independent IT expert 38 %
My internet service provider 12 %
The Academic and Research
Network of Slovenia (Arnes),
SICERT
5 %
Figure 4: Self-protective measures – response in the event of an unauthorised computer hack
4.  SELF-REPORT  STUDY  ON  VIOLATING  OF  THE
PRIVACY OF OTHERS
We asked the respondents whether they had ever violated the privacy of
others or exercised other forms of surveillance.
Figure 5: Self-reports on violating the privacy of others
While  collecting  personal  data  from  publicly  available  databases  is
unsurprisingly common – only 28% of the respondents have never Googled
other people – the use or creation of malicious code is fairly rare. About
one-tenth of the respondents have demonstrated deviant behaviour in social
network environments. When the respondents were asked about the types
of  behaviour  that  constitute  a  violation  of  another  person’s  privacy,  we
received the following results:
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Figure 6: Self-report on violations of another person’s privacy on social networks
Publishing  photographs  without  the  prior  consent  of  the  depicted
person  ranks  as  the  biggest  violation  of  another  person’s  privacy.
Publication of a photograph with the respondent’s face clearly visible was
performed by 78% of respondents (30% more than once); by comparing the
first and second rounds of surveying, we can observe that such posting of
photographs increased over time.
5. CONCERN FOR DATA PROTECTION
We asked the respondents about their degree of concern for data protection
(sample = n1).
Figure 7: How concerned are you about the protection of your own personal data? 
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The  greatest  matter  of  concern  for  the  respondents  appears  to  be
the internet: 70% of the respondents are “quite” or “very” concerned about
the  internet.  Concern  also  arises  as  regards  being  connected  to  wireless
networks  (53%)  or  using  mobile  telephones  (45%).  In  carrying  out
a temporal  comparison between n1,  n2, and n3 we found no statistically
significant differences.
How concerned are you about the protection of your 
own personal data regarding the following matters:
Chi-square d. f. P(H0) Cramer’s
coefficient
Using the Internet 14.6 4 0.00 0.16
Wi-fi networks 0.0 4 0.30 0.00
The process of making a personal ID card 0.0 4 0.82 0.00
Loyalty programmes offered by retail chains 0.0 4 0.50 0.00
Video surveillance on roads 12.1 4 0.02 0.15
Video monitoring in urban environments 9.7 4 0.05 0.13
While using the “Urbana” city smart card in Ljubljana 0.0 4 0.08 0.00
While using mobile phones 15.7 4 0.00 0.17
Table 1: How concerned are you about the protection of your own
personal data regarding the following matters? – gender differences
The results show that gender only slightly impacts concern regarding
data  protection  on  the  internet  (χ²  =  14.6,  p  =  0.006),  video  surveillance
on roads (χ² = 12.1,  p = 0.016) and especially while using mobile phones
(χ² =  15.7,  p  =  0.003).  The  Cramer  coefficient  also  shows  a  moderate
correlation (0.16, 0.15, 0.17, respectively). Women express greater concern in
all three variables.
5.1 PERSONAL DATA SAFETY CONCERN REGARDING 
THE INTERNET
We asked the respondents  what  their  views are on personal  data  safety
while  using  the  internet.  There are no  statistically  significant  differences
in time or between genders (sample = n2).
Remarkably,  one-quarter  of  the  respondents  are  convinced  that  they
have zero control over data revealed in social networks, despite the fact that
almost two-thirds of the respondents set their privacy settings to a “private”
mode, and that over two-thirds only communicate online with persons they
have known before and in spite of the fact that 80% of the respondents do
not share their social network passwords with anyone. 
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6.  HOW  RESPONDENTS  PERCEIVE  THOSE  CARRYING
OUT SURVEILLANCE
When  asked  how  much  certain  entities  threaten  their  privacy,
the respondents deemed “internet giants” to be the greatest threat, as 56%
of the  respondents  answered “a lot”(4)  and “very  much”  (5)  concerning
such. Telecom operators came second (25%), and retail chains with “loyalty
cards” (23%) third. (Sample = n1).
Figure 8: On a scale of 1 to 5, to what degree do you feel the following threaten your privacy?
On a scale of 1 to 5, to what degree do you feel the 
following threaten your privacy:
Chi-square d. f. P(H0) Cramer’s
coefficient
Law enforcement agencies 21.5 4 0.00 0.20
Public social care agencies (e.g. social work centres) 3.8 4 0.43 0.08
The Slovenian Intelligence and Security Agency (SOVA) 39.3 4 0.00 0.27
The Slovenian armed forces 18.8 4 0.00 0.19
Foreign intelligence agencies 40.9 4 0.00 0.28
Internet giants (e.g. Google, Facebook) 1.2 4 0.87 0.05
Retail chains with “loyalty programmes” 7.4 4 0.12 0.12
Telecom operators 8.6 4 0.70 0.13
Neighbours 12.4 4 0.15 0.15
Private security companies 21.4 4 0.00 0.20
Your employer, university, or school 3.6 4 0.46 0.08
Table 2: On a scale of 1 to 5, to what degree do you feel
the following threaten your privacy? – gender differences
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The link between privacy threats and gender is weak for all variables in
this category.
Men feel slightly more threatened by foreign intelligence services (χ² =
40.9,  p = 0.000) and by the Slovenian Intelligence and Security Agency –
SOVA (χ² = 39.3, p = 0.000).  The Cramer coefficient  indicates a moderate
correlation (0.28 and 0.27, respectively).
By  using  ordinal  logistic  regression,  we  discovered  that  male
respondents respond to this question 0.34 times more with lower ratings
(foreign intelligence services) and 0.38 times more with lower ratings when
evaluating  privacy  threats  by  the  Slovenian  Intelligence  and  Security
Agency (SOVA); see Figure 9.
Figure 9: Foreign intelligence services
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Figure 10: The Slovenian Intelligence and Security Agency – SOVA
A  comparison  of  the  responses  regarding  perceived  threats  from
domestic  and foreign intelligence  services  before and after  the Snowden
leaks (June 2013) shows that not many people had felt threatened by these
intelligence services prior to this event (survey 2012 –2013); a threat level
of “zero” was declared by 65% and 60%, respectively, while the same reply
in  the  survey after  the affair  (September 2013 – January 2014)  was  only
chosen by, respectively, 48 and 44%.
We  are  able  to  demonstrate  this  by  comparing  the  mean (arithmetic
middle)  and calculating  standard deviations:  we  detected an increase  in
the mean from 1.67 to 2.14 for foreign intelligence services and an increase
from 1.76 to 1.99 for the Slovenian Intelligence and Security Agency. 
The standard deviations are similar in both surveys, but they are quite
large, which means that the value – an assessment of individual responses –
is scattered around the mean.
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Figure 11: Perceived privacy threats by intelligence services over time – the mean
Standard deviations:
- Slovenian Intelligence and Security Agency SOVA:
n1 = 1.135, n3 = 1.143;
- Foreign intelligence services: n1 = 1.112, n3 = 1.224.
We  detected  an  increased  fear  of  privacy  violations  by  intelligence
services amongst both men and women. For men, the mean increased from
2.09 to 2.48 (foreign intelligence services) and slightly decreased from 2.17
to 2.13 regarding the Slovenian Intelligence and Security Agency (SOVA).
However,  women  have  greater  fear  regarding  domestic  and  foreign
intelligence agencies:  both values increased, i.e.  from 1.46 to 1.91 (foreign
intelligence services) and from 1.55 to 1.90 (SOVA).
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Figure 12: Perceived privacy threats by intelligence services over time (Men) - the mean
The respondents are very well aware of the fact that intelligence agencies
around the world do not dispose with the same amount of power. While
the US intelligence services exploit the fact that internet giants are American
companies regulated to a great extent by the national law, other intelligence
services, e.g. those from the Central and East European countries, can not
enjoy  the  benefit  of  using  pressure  on  such  companies.  Accordingly,
respondents do not perceive domestic intelligence agencies as threatening
as foreign intelligence services. 
There is also another nationally relevant reason for decrease in Slovenia;
and perhaps also in other Central and East European countries. The right-
wing governments perceive intelligence services as remnant of the socialist
past. These services were constantly under attack after the fall of the Berlin
wall  of  not  being  enough  “democratic”.  They  were  also  underfunded.
The public  shaming  of  the  Slovenian  intelligence  community  was  far-
reaching. Several “political affairs” lead to disclosure of their hidden places
and  their  agents  were  also  compromised.  Therefore,  national  civil
intelligence agency is not perceived as a dangerous agency, but as a weak
one and not able to conduct huge operations.
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Figure 13: Perceived privacy threats by intelligence services over time (Women) – the mean
7. THE VALUE OF PRIVACY
Respondents  are  willing  to  give  up  their  privacy  and  divulge  personal
information  in  exchange for  certain  benefits.  We were interested in  how
much privacy they are willing to give up. The question we asked them was
the  following:  “Are  you  willing  to  submit  your  personal  information
(e.g. date of birth, sex, e-mail) in exchange for...” (sample= n1).
Figure 14: The value of privacy
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The respondents felt that entering a prize drawing is the least tempting
reason to divulge their personal information: 62% of respondents would not
submit  their  personal  information  for  such  a  possible  benefit.  However,
the majority of respondents are willing to give up their privacy for at least
a 10% discount when purchasing an airline  ticket (52%) and many (42%)
for at least a 10% discount in an online shop.
When comparing the surveys carried out over time (n1 vs. n3), we only
observed  a  statistically  significant  difference  regarding  the  option
of obtaining  “a  payable  computer  program”,  where  the  number
of respondents  who  would  not  submit  their  personal  information  for
the aforementioned benefit increased (n1 = 51%, n3 = 61%).
Are you willing to submit your personal information 
(e.g. date of birth, sex, e-mail address) in exchange for:
Chi-square d. f. P(H0) Cramer’s
coefficient
A free newsletter about new products, catalogues 28.2 2 0.00 0.23
Access to a payable online journal 0.3 2 0.99 0.02
Access to a payable computer program 7.0 2 0.30 0.11
A minimum of a 10% discount at an online shop 0.3 2 0.99 0.02
A minimum of a 10% discount on an airfare 1.7 2 0.42 0.06
A free e-book 13.7 2 0.00 0.16
A prize drawing (main prize over €1,000) 1.9 2 0.38 0.06
Table 3: “Are you willing to submit your personal information
(e.g. date of birth, sex, e-mail) in exchange for...?” – gender differences
Gender differences are statistically significant for the option of obtaining
“information on products,  catalogues,  news” (χ² = 28.2,  sig.  = 0.000) and
a “free e-book” (χ² = 13.7, sig. = 0.001). The Cramer’s coefficient indicates
a moderate  correlation  (0.23  and 0.16,  respectively).  With  both variables,
men are more reluctant to divulge their personal information.
Finally, we asked respondents about their willingness to support various
surveillance technologies on Slovenian roads.
Most  respondents  support  speed cameras  on  all  road  sections  where
there  have  been  fatalities  in  the  last  decade  (58%).  The  least  popular
measure  is  the  installation  of  traffic  light  cameras,  at  43%.  There  is  no
statistically significant gender or temporal difference.
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8. VIEWS ON MANDATORY DATA RETENTION 
REGULATION
Most  (53%)  of  the  respondents  (sample  =  n1)  were  not  aware
of the provisions  of  the  Slovenian  Electronic  Communications  Act  on
the mandatory retention of mobile and internet communication traffic data
by mobile operators (e.g. information on the persons involved,  the time,
date, and length of mobile calls, e-mails, visits to certain online addresses,
mobile phone location data) for 14 or 8 months.11 We were curious if, due
to the mandatory data retention,  respondents tend to decrease mobile  or
internet communications; the majority, who had previously been informed
of  the provisions,  replied “no” (83%).  Similarly,  when respondents  were
asked  if  they  believe  that  due  to  data  retention  other  people  tend  to
communicate less with them, only 8% were sure others communicate less.
There is no statistically significant difference between genders.
Furthermore,  we  asked  the  respondents  if,  despite  such  statutory
retention, they were willing to use mobile or internet communication for
issues  that  are  of  a  more  personal  nature  (e.g.  communication  with
a psychotherapist,  a  lawyer,  or  a  priest):  48% of  respondents  would use
these channels of communication despite the data retention regulation.
Despite the obligatory retention of data, are you willing
to use mobile or internet communication for issues that
are of a more personal nature (e.g. communication 
with a psychotherapist, a lawyer, or a priest):
Chi-square d. f. P(H0) Cramer’s
coefficient
16.9 10 0.00 0.18
Table 4: Data retention and usage of mobile or internet
communication for personal matters – gender differences
The  value  of  the  chi-square,  and  consequently  Cramer’s  coefficient,
shows a weak correlation between variables, but is statistically significant.
Women tend to take fewer risks when it  comes to communicating about
personal matters (χ² = 19.9, sig. = .000).
11 Electronic Communications Act (Official Gazette RS, no 109/12, 110/13, 40/14 and 54/14 –
ZIN-B).
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9.  AWARENESS  OF  PERSONAL  DATA  PROTECTION
REMEDIES
In the last set of questions (sample = n1), we asked the respondents whether
and how much they know about the national data protection authority (the
Information Commissioner of the Republic of Slovenia – IC). Only 39.5%
of the respondents were aware that they can turn to the IC to exercise their
right to be informed of their personal data stored or processed by others.
41.6% of the  respondents  knew that  they can turn to the IC when their
employer or University installs video surveillance without informing them.
A  staggering  68.6%  did  not  know  that  the  IC  is  the  authority  to  turn
to when  a  potential  employer  demands  information  regarding  family
or children. Luckily, awareness seems to be slightly better when confronted
with personal data abuse for marketing purposes (e.g. spam), where 45.3%
of respondents knew that the IC would be the right entity to turn to for
help,  while  59.7%  of  respondents  knew  that  the  IC  can  help  in  cases
of communication eavesdropping.
Are you aware of the possibility to address the 
Information Commissioner (national data protection 
authority) in the event of...
Chi-square d. f. P(H0) Cramer’s
coefficient
A complaint regarding the right to be informed about the 
collection of your personal data, e.g. by insurance 
companies or retail chains? 
9.9 1 0.00 0.14
A university’s/employer’s failure to inform you of video 
monitoring of their premises? 
6.9 1 0.01 0.11
Personal data abuse in targeted marketing, e.g. when you 
receive tailored unwanted e-mail (spam)?
5.2 1 0.02 0.10
Suspicion of communication recording? 0.7 1 0.41 0.04
A potential employer's demand for information regarding 
family or children?
0.8 1 0.37 0.04
Table 5: Familiarity with the Information Commissioner’s work – gender differences
A  statistically  significant  difference  exists  between  the  first  three
questions and gender; the value of the chi-square and Cramer’s coefficient
is  low. Men seem to be better acquainted with the possibility of turning
to the Information Commissioner in the event of a violation of privacy.
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10. CONCLUSION
The article shows how perception of privacy changes over time and how
the awareness of surveillance society has increased because of Snowden’s
revelations. We feel it is important that citizen are aware of contemporary
surveillance  practices  as  these  affect  their  lives  significantly  not  only  by
denying  them  their  privacy  but  also  leading  to  “social  sorting”12 and
to discrimination. The article shows how awareness of surveillance regimes
has  increased.  This  offers  a  signal  for  policy  makers  to  reform,
e.g. intelligence  services,  to  designing  more  efficient  supervisory
mechanisms and increase accountability of those in power.
The  online  survey  results  show attitudes  towards  privacy  in  various
surveillance  domains,  particularly  on  the  internet  and  public
telecommunications networks and the road surveillance  domain.  Despite
the fact that we asked the respondents about their attitudes towards other
surveillance  domains  and  about  other  data  managers  and  processors,
the results  show  that  respondents  seem  to  be  mostly  worried  about
the protection  of  personal  data  in  public  telecommunications  networks,
i.e. when using the internet and mobile phones.
The internet has become an integral part of our lives and it is difficult to
find many everyday activities that do not leave a digital trail and/or which
are  also  not  connected  to  public  telecommunications  networks.  That  is
the reason  why  the  majority  of  the  respondents  are  concerned  about
personal data protection on the internet since this is a sphere that does not
grant the same degree of privacy as non-digital  environments where the
possibility of self-protection seems to be greater.  In other words, we feel
that we are able to control paper money much more than a Bitcoin digital
wallet.
Having said that, the cynicism of our respondents is surprising: about
one-quarter of the respondents believe that they have zero control over data
revealed  in  social  networks,  in  spite  of  the  relatively  high  level  of  self-
protection measures used there. This indicates that these measures (e.g. we
asked them about privacy settings in social networks, password discretion
and  sharing  passwords  with  others,  exercising  prudence  in  online
communications)  are  easily  circumvented,  according  to  the  respondents.
A imilar,  perhaps  cynical,  attitude  can  be  observed  in  the  consumer
12 See Lyon, D. 2003, Surveillance after September 11, Polity Press, Cambridge.
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surveillance domain with regard to loyalty programmes. The respondents
quickly  “sell”  personal  data  in  exchange  for  a  certain  benefit.
If the respondents  gain  some  profit  from  their  personal  data,  their
reluctance to share such data quickly vanishes.
The respondents are well  aware of consumer  profiling,  segmentation,
etc.,  in  the  consumer  surveillance  domain,  but  due  to  the  overgrowing
apathy and resignation (and not naivety), retail chains are highly successful
in  obtaining  their  often  detailed,  and  not  truly  necessary  for  business,
personal data – akin to internet users who do not genuinely believe their
personal data is actually protected. Finding themselves in this “wild west”
of privacy, they feel it does not matter if they hand over their personal data
voluntarily in order to gain at least some benefit from their personal data.13 
When  we  examine  the  answers  to  the  question  of  who  represents
the largest threat to privacy, we can observe a growing distrust towards for-
profit  companies.  A solid  half  of  the  respondents  hold the  opinion  that
online  giants  (e.g.  Google,  Facebook)  are  the  main  entities  carrying  out
surveillance. In times of crisis, an obvious negative attitude towards such
companies  that  practically  “swallow”  their  users  has  been  growing.
Therefore, it is not surprising that we witnessed such views in the survey,
where  the  next  biggest  threat  perceived  by  respondents  comes  from
telecommunications  companies  and  retail  chains  with  their  “loyalty”
programmes.
The  respondents  feel  that  the  fundamental  reason  for  collecting  and
processing personal data (and consequently threatening privacy) is to profit
from others, as they do not benefit whatsoever from submitting this data.
We found the respondents’ views on traffic and location data retention
performed by telecom operators to be quite casual;  83% do not decrease
their internet or mobile communications and 92% of the respondents do not
believe  that  other  people  tend  to  communicate  less  with  them  due  to
the above  mentioned  data  retention.  One  cannot  help  but  wonder  what
would indeed be a sufficient deterrent to the public’s careless use of these
communication channels.
Most of the survey was conducted before Edward Snowden leaked NSA
documents to the public in June 2013 and before the judgment of the Court
of Justice of the European Union (C-293/12 in C-594/12) that declared such
13 Nocera, J. The Wild West Of Privacy. Viewed 7 january 2015. Available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/25/opinion/nocera- the-wild-west-of-privacy.html?_r=0.
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data retention to be disproportionate and lacking appropriate safeguards.
With this in mind, it would perhaps be appropriate to repeat the survey. 
We  were,  however,  able  to  verify  the  influences  of  Snowden’s
disclosures with the question on potential threats to privacy by national and
foreign intelligence services.  The results  indicate  that the perceived level
of threat did indeed increase after June 2013. In our opinion,  this can be
attributed  to  Snowden’s  disclosures,  which  caused  an  immense  change
in people’s awareness and broadened the perception of the vast presence,
actions,  and powers  of such intelligence  services,  all  of  which generated
negative  feelings,  anger,  and  fear  among  the  majority  of  respondents
and even  deepened  distrust  towards  internet  giants  and  the  hidden
surveillance state.
Ordinary  citizens  tend  to  be  “hostages”  of  traditional  as  well  as
distributed powers, which are creating havoc in the digital environment.14
They have neither the expertise nor means to fend off the rapid and broad
authority of both power centres.15 It seems difficult to prevent surveillance
by the state intelligence or to maintain control over our personal data that
large  corporations  in  possession  of.  Similarly,  there  seems  to  be  little
ordinary  citizens  can  do  to  ward  off  fraud  perpetrated  by  criminal
organizations,  who  are  highly  flexible  in  their  use  of  new  information
technologies. Accordingly, we seem to live in an “internet feudalism”: the
feudal lords are googles, amazons, apples, etc., whom we are able to freely
choose, in exchange for certain benefits and protection, while we pay for
this “security” in a direct or indirect way by submitting our personal data
as some sort of feudal currency.16 
“Privacy” is a concept that changes over time and space, while the law
is lagging behind IT development, e.g. the recently unimaginable “privacy
in public” is something the law should protect as well. We enter into social
relations,  which by definition produce a form of control, on an everyday
basis. As Lyon (2001) observed, surveillance is a relational concept and so is




16 On  this  subject  before  Datagate:  Schneier,  B.  When It  Comes  To  Security,  We're  Back  To
Feudalism. Viewed 12 December 2014. Available at: 
https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2012/11/when_it_comes_to_sec.html. 
After Snowden: Schneier, B. Power In The Age Of The Feudal Internet. Viewed 2 January 2015.
Available at: http:// en.collaboratory.de/w/Power_in_the_Age_of_the_Feudal_Internet.
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privacy.17 It includes the power dynamics and is Janus-faced when it comes
to  control  and  care.  Similarly,  the  Slovenian  criminologist  Pečar  (1991)
claimed  that  social  control  is  a  double-edged  sword:  control  inevitably
occurs every time two individuals meet either in the form of surveillance or
care.18
Due to the omnipresent nature of contemporary surveillance practices, it
is difficult  to assess what the processing of massive amounts of personal
data (encapsulated in the saying that “data is the new fuel”) means for our
society.  In  the  future  it  will  be  necessary  to  investigate  what  our  own
contribution to such development is and how much we are able to perceive
this slippery slope towards the “death of privacy”, critically reflect on it and
combat  the  insatiable  greed  of  governments  and  corporations  for  our
personal data.
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